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It is understood that mind wandering utilizes executive resources to some extent, but the 
underlying processes involved with the initiation and maintenance of mind wandering remains 
unclear. Here we used a new approach to estimate the time of focus and time of mind wandering 
separately in two different experiments. In experiment 1, we combined the self-caught and 
probe-caught methods to estimate the time of focus and time of mind wandering separately, and 
examined their relationship to working memory capacity. Here participants performed an 
OSPAN task and subsequently a basic Mindfulness Meditation Task (focus on breath), where 
participants indicated when they became aware that they were mind wandering (self-caught 
method and subsequently the probe-caught method). Results showed that time of focus but not 
time of mind wandering increased with greater working memory capacity, suggesting that 
individuals with higher working memory capacity were able to focus on the current task longer, 
but had little effect on the ability to catch themselves mind wandering after it occurred. In 
experiment 2, participants read both easy and difficult reading passages and the method of 
probing for mind wandering experiences were similar to experiment 1 (self-caught method and 
subsequently the probe-caught method). Here results showed longer time of focus in the easy 
readings compared to the hard readings, but no difference in time of mind wandering, suggesting 
that individuals were able to focus longer on the easy readings, but once mind wandering occurs, 
it will last a comparable amount of time regardless of reading difficulty. Taken together, these 
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During task performance internal thoughts can often grab our attention and prevent us 
from focusing on the present task at hand (McVay et al. 2009; Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; 
Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). Although a widely experienced phenomena, the exact definition 
of mind wandering varies across the literature, but can be broadly defined as a shift of attention 
away from the primary task at hand to internal thoughts (Christoff et al., 2016; McVay et al. 
2009; Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). The key defining 
characteristics here in determining mind wandering is an unconstrained and typically 
spontaneous shift of attention to internal thoughts that are not related to the current task one is 
performing (Christoff et al., 2016; McVay et al. 2009; Seli et al., 2016; Smallwood and Schooler, 
2006; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). One important methodological issue in regards to the 
study of mind wandering is that to date there has not been an accepted empirical method to 
differentiate the initiation of mind wandering (ie. processes involved with inhibiting mind 
wandering from occurring) from the maintenance of mind wandering (ie. processes involved 
with maintaining and/or detecting mind wandering after it has occurred) (Smallwood et al., 
2013). As such, due to this lack of distinction between the initiation and the maintenance when 
studying mind wandering, confusion between the interpretation of empirical results between 
studies, and subsequently specific theories explaining these results, can ensue.  
For example, it is accepted that mind wandering utilizes executive control resources to 
some extent, but the underlying cognitive processes involved with the initiation and maintenance 
of mind wandering remains unclear (McVay and Kane, 2010; McVay and Kane, 2012; 
Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Smallwood, 2013). As such, the contradictory predictions of two 





result of executive control resources acting differently in regards to the initiation of mind 
wandering and the maintenance of mind wandering (Smallwood, 2013).  
As such, the aim of this thesis is to 1) discuss the current methodology used to study 
mind wandering, 2) discuss specific theories relating executive control resources and task 
difficulty (specifically reading difficulty) with mind wandering, and 3) discuss two experiments 
designed to empirically test the initiation and maintenance of mind wandering in relationship to 
working memory capacity and task difficulty, specifically reading difficulty.    
Mind Wandering Methodology 
Multiple methods have been developed to study mind wandering. These methods include 
off-line or post-hoc measurements, such as administering self report questionnaires immediately 
after a task to measure mind wandering tendencies (Helton & Warm, 2008; Smallwood et al., 
2012; Smallwood et al., 2009), and on-line measurements where participants are interrupted 
while performing a task to sample mind wandering. These on-line measurements include self-
caught methods, dichotomous probe caught methods and more detailed probe caught methods 
including likert scales and confidence ratings (Bastian and Sackur, 2013; Christoff et al., 2009; 
Hasenkamp et al, 2012; Seli et al., 2015; Mazek et al., 2012; Mrazek et al., 2013; Smallwood and 
Schooler 2006; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). Although different methods to measure mind 
wandering are used across the literature, the most common methods used are the self-caught and 
dichotomous probe-caught methods (the primary focus of this paper).  
The self-caught method is an on-line measuring method where participants are asked to 
report out (usually with a button press) when they realize their focus is off of the current task 
they are performing (Braboszcz and Delorme 2010; Bastian and Sackur, 2013; Hasenkamp et al., 





frequency of self-caught reports (and inversely the duration of time between reports) is 
interpreted as an indication of the likelihood or tendency for an individual to mind wander. That 
is, the lower number of mind wandering instances reported (or the longer the duration is between 
reports) is usually interpreted as a lower tendency or likelihood to mind wander. A higher 
number of mind wandering instances reported (or a shorter duration between reports), in contrast 
is usually interpreted as a higher tendency or likelihood to mind wander (Braboszcz and Delorme 
2010; Bastian and Sackur, 2013; Hasenkamp et al., 2012; Smallwood and Schooler 2006; 
Smallwood and Schooler et al., 2015). 
The probe-caught method, on the other hand, is an on-line measuring method where 
participants are interrupted (usually with a tone or a screen display) at different time intervals 
while performing a task (Bastian and Sackur, 2013; Christoff et al., 2009; Seli et al., 2013; 
Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). Participants are asked to report whether their focus was on the 
task at hand, or if they were mind wandering at the time of the probe. Here the probes 
distinguished as being in the mind wandering state can be divided by the total number of probes 
given, to get the proportion of time an individual was mind wandering. Thus the probe-caught 
method can provide a measure of the overall proportion of time an individual was in a mind 
wandering state based on the mind wandering probe rate (Bastian and Sackur, 2013; Seli et al., 
2013; Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). Traditionally a higher proportion or percentage of probes 
caught in the mind wandering state is thought to indicate a higher tendency or likelihood to mind 
wander, whereas a lower proportion or percentage of mind wandering probes is thought to 
indicate a lower tendency or likelihood to mind wander. 
Although using the self-caught and the probe-caught method separately to measure mind 





interpretations of mind wandering. One issue is the use of the term likelihood or tendency when 
interpreting the results using the self-caught and the probe-caught method. As Smallwood (2013) 
describes, different subcomponents can encompass mind wandering (such as the initiation of 
mind wandering and the maintenance of mind wandering once it occurs), but to date there is a 
lack of method to covertly detect the onset of mind wandering, making mind wandering difficult 
to study (Smallwood, 2013). For example, to get a clearer understanding of the processes 
underlying mind wandering, one can look at what can be defined as a focus-mind wandering 
episode, or the time when an individual starts focusing (or refocusing) on a task, to when an 
individual realizes s/he is mind wandering and terminates the mind wandering (Figure 1a). As 
illustrated in Figure 1a, a focus-mind wandering episode therefore consists of a period when an 
individual is focused on the current task they are performing (denoted as Tfocus), and a period 
when they are actually mind wandering (denoted as TMW). When looking at the current use of the 
self- and probe-caught methods to measure the tendency of mind wandering through the time 
course of a focus-mind wandering episode, potential problems arise. 
For example, when using only the self-caught method, one can get a measurement of 
when an individual realizes s/he was mind wandering, and thus a measurement of the entire 
focus-mind wandering episode duration (denoted as Tself), as illustrated in Figure 1a. This 
measurement however includes both the duration of time when an individual is focusing on the 
current task at hand (Tfocus) and the duration of time an individual is actually mind wandering 
(TMW). Thus with the self-caught method one cannot distinguish the focus state duration (Tfocus) 
from the mind wandering state duration (TMW) because the onset of the mind wandering state 
cannot be measured. As a result, individuals might have different durations they are actually 





participants might show the same self-caught mind wandering frequency or duration. For 
example, as illustrated in Figure 1b even though both participants (P1 and P2) catch themselves 
mind wandering at the same frequency, one participant (P1) could have a short duration of being 
in the focus state (10 sec) and a longer duration of being in the mind wandering state (30 sec), 
while another participant (P2) might have a long duration of focusing on the task at hand (30 sec) 
and a short duration of being in the mind wandering state (10 sec). Using only the self-caught 
method, this difference cannot be distinguished, showing the potential flaw in using the self-
caught method alone when studying mind wandering.  
On the other hand, the probe-caught method measures the relative proportion of time 
people are in a focus state and a mind wandering state if the probes are randomly or uniformly 
distributed across the focus-mind wandering episode. For example, if probes are uniformly 
sampled then the chance a probe happens to land at a time while the participant is mind 
wandering is determined by the overall proportion of time s/he spends in mind wandering 
(p(MW)). One caveat in using the probe-caught method alone is that it cannot determine the 
duration of time an individual spends in a focus state and in a mind wandering state in individual 
episodes, it can only tell you the relative proportion of the two states. For example, as illustrated 
in Figure 1c, one participant (P1) might be able to maintain on focus for 10 sec before starting to 
mind wander, and then remain mind wandering for 30 sec before catching mind wandering and 
returning to the task, while P2 might stay on focus for 5 sec before getting into a mind wandering 
state for 15 sec. By probing uniformly across a focus-mind wandering episode using only the 
probe caught method, both participants would show mind wandering 75% of the time. Looking 
at these two participants’ mind wandering durations however would show different time 





using the probe-caught method alone. 
Overall, the methodological limitations of using the self-caught and the probe-caught 
method alone can lead to confusion and misinterpretations in evaluating people’s tendencies to 
mind wander. For example, Figure 1d shows two participants and their mind wandering time 
courses.  Here participant 1(P1) shows an average of 15 seconds in the focus state, and 5 seconds 
in the mind wandering state. On the other hand participant 2 (P2) has 10 seconds in the focus 
state, and 30 seconds in the mind wandering state. Using only the self-caught method, P1 would 
self-catch her/himself mind wandering 3 times per minute, resulting in a focus-mind wandering 
episode duration of 20 seconds. P2 would self-catch her/himself mind wandering at a rate of 1.5 
times per minute, resulting in an overall focus-mind wandering episode duration of 40 seconds. 
Using only the self-caught method alone, P1 would conventionally be interpreted as having a 
higher tendency to mind wander compared to P2, since P1’s self-reported mind wandering 
frequency is higher than P2’s.  
Using only the probe-caught method to measure mind wandering for P1 and P2 would 
produce the opposite conclusion. For example, in Figure 1d, P1 would be caught in the focus 
state 75% of the time and in the mind wandering state 25% of the time, while P2 would be 
caught in the focus state 25% of the time and in a mind wandering state 75% of the time, if 
probed uniformly. Thus, because P1 is in a focus state proportionally more and a mind 
wandering state proportionally less than P2, P1 would be considered to have a lesser tendency to 
mind wander than P2. As illustrated, in some situations, the self-caught method and probe-caught 
method can have contradictory interpretations on more vs less tendency to mind wander, 
showing that the tendency to mind wander is intrinsically ambiguous. This ambiguity, along with 





reason why certain theories aimed to explain mind wandering are in conflict. 
Figure 1 
  
Figure 1. A theoretical analysis of the traditional interpretations of mind wandering tendency based on the self- and  
probe-caught methods. a) the different states of a focus-mind wandering episode.  b) problems of the self-caught 
method as a measure of mind wandering tendency. Participant 1 (P1) and participant 2 (P2), both have focus-mind 
wandering episodes of the same duration, but the duration in the mind wandering state of P1 is longer and the 
duration in the focus state is shorter, than for P2. These two scenarios cannot be distinguished using only the self-
caught method. c) problems of the probe-caught method as a measure of mind wandering tendency. The ratio 
between times in a focus state and times in a mind wandering state is the same for both participants, but the actual 
durations of being in the focus state and mind wandering state is different. These two scenarios cannot be 
distinguished using only the probe-caught method alone.  d) conflicts between the self-caught method and the probe-
caught method. Here the probe-caught and the self-caught method used alone leads to contradictory interpretations 










Figure 1 (cont) 
                     
Figure 1 cont. c) problems of the probe-caught method d) conflicts between the self- and the probe-caught method. 
 
Mind Wandering and Executive Control Resources  
 An important issue on theories of mind wandering is the role of executive control 
resources on mind wandering during task performance. Many studies have been conducted to 
better understand the relationship between executive control and mind wandering, but there is 
debate in the literature on whether mind wandering consumes executive control resources or 
whether mind wandering rather results from a failure of executive control (Levinson et al., 2012; 
McVay and Kane, 2010; Randall et al., 2014; Smallwood and Schooler 2006). Smallwood and 
Schooler (2006) proposed that mind wandering must require executive control resources 





resource free process resulting from a failure in executive control (Executive Control 
Hypothesis). Results from studies investigating mind wandering in regards to working memory 
capacity and task difficulty have been used as evidence to justify each theory. 
According to the Resource Hypothesis mind wandering competes for the same executive 
control resources needed to maintain focus on a current task (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). 
Here the same executive control resources intended to keep an individual focused on the current 
task at hand, are diverted from the current task and used to entertain internal mind wandering 
instances (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). As such, when more executive control resources are 
available, more mind wandering should be present (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006).  Support for 
the resource hypothesis comes from findings on mind wandering and task demand. For example, 
multiple studies have indicated that mind wandering instances increase with tasks that are less 
demanding and thus require less executive control resources, allowing for more executive control 
resources to be available to mind wander (such as breath awareness tasks, familiar and trained 
tasks, tasks with low cognitive load, etc.) and decrease during high demanding tasks that require 
more executive control resources (such as tasks with increasing cognitive load, novel tasks, 
increased stimulus presentation, etc.) (Antrobus, 1968; Levinson et al. 2012; Rummel and 
Boywitt 2014; Teasdale et al., 1995; Thomson et al., 2013). Here while performing low 
demanding tasks, less executive resources are being used to engage in the low demanding tasks, 
and thus more executive resources are available to mind wander (Smallwood and Schooler, 
2006). Thus mind wandering can be present while still having enough available resources 
directed to the current task (Smallwood and Schooler 2006). During high demanding tasks more 
executive control resources are used to perform the high demanding task, and thus fewer 





Thus less mind wandering should occur in more demanding or difficult tasks (Smallwood and 
Schooler 2006). 
On the other hand, according to the Executive Control Hypothesis, mind wandering is 
related to an individual’s level of executive control, and their ability to block out mind 
wandering (McVay and Kane, 2009; McVay and Kane, 2010; McVay and Kane, 2012; Unsworth 
and McMillan, 2012). Kane and McVay (2010) explain that this view is heavily based on 
Watkin’s (2008) elaborated control theory and Klinger’s (1971) current concerns theory. In this 
view, it is believed that the default mode of mental processing (for example, in the absence of 
directed working thought such as goal pursuit or action, is one in which current concerns and 
higher order abstract goals are automatically and continually processed (Klinger, 1971; McVay 
and Kane 2010). Thus mind wandering is a result from a failure in executive control to block 
thoughts about current concerns (the default mode) during task performance (McVay and Kane 
2010). Importantly here, McVay and Kane (2010) explain that mind wandering does not 
consume executive control resources, but instead executive control resources are responsible for 
blocking out the occurrence of mind wandering which occur in a continuous resource free way, 
which is a default mode (McVay and Kane, 2010). Thus individuals with lower executive control 
resources will be worse at blocking out mind wandering, which will lead to more mind 
wandering during task performance (McVay and Kane, 2010). Support for the executive control 
hypothesis comes from studies on individual differences of working memory capacity and mind 
wandering showing that higher working memory capacity is related to less mind wandering in 
tasks such as the sustained attention to response task and reading comprehension tasks (McVay 
and Kane, 2009, McVay and Kane, 2012; Unsworth and McMillan, 2012). In addition, multiple 





network) associated with rest states (without task) and mind wandering, again suggesting a link 
between mind wandering and the default mode (Buckner et al., 2008; Christoff et al., 2009; 
Hasenkamp et al., 2012; Mason et al., 2007).   
Mind Wandering and Reading Difficulty  
Although multiple studies in regards to task difficulty has shown mind wandering 
increases during less demanding tasks and decreases during high demanding tasks that require 
more executive control resources (Antrobus, 1968; Levinson et al. 2012; Rummel and Boywitt 
2014; Teasdale et al., 1995; Thomson et al., 2013), recent studies investigating reading difficulty 
have found the opposite pattern showing that mind wandering was more prevalent in difficult 
reading passages compared to easy reading passages (Feng et al., 2013). One explanation for this 
trend, which is related to the Executive Control Hypothesis and the Resource Hypothesis, is 
one’s ability to form a situational model while reading texts. The Situational Model states that 
while reading texts, a model of the current interpretation of the text meaning is formed (Feng et 
al., 2013; Smallwood, 2011; Smallwood et al., 2008). This model includes both explicit 
information and inferences from the text, linking general knowledge to the text at hand, and 
helping to link information presented at different sections in the text (Feng et al., 2013; 
Smallwood, 2011; Smallwood et al., 2008). With this model, it is believed that in difficult 
readings, maintaining attention and comprehending the reading can be more difficult because 
there are more discontinuities in the cohesion of the reading (Feng et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 
2008). Due to the increased difficulty to maintain attention and focus on difficult readings, more 
mind wandering should occur because there is difficulty constructing this situational model, 
either due to insufficient resources such as in the Resource Hypothesis, or a failure of executive 






Although the Resource Hypothesis and the Executive Control Hypothesis predict 
contradictory patterns in regards to mind wandering behavior, the process-occurrence framework 
by Smallwood (2013), explains that these two theories might not actually be in complete 
opposition. The key component here is that mind wandering has different elements that might 
behave differently, namely the initiation and the maintenance of mind wandering (Smallwood, 
2013). For example, as Smallwood (2013) explains, executive control could influence mind 
wandering directly (inhibiting mind wandering from being initiated) or indirectly (maintenance 
and continuation of mind wandering). Thus these hypotheses are not in direct conflict, as each 
can illuminate the role of executive control in different states of mind wandering. To get a better 
understanding of mind wandering then, the process-occurrence framework stresses the 
importance of looking at the initiation and the maintenance of mind wandering separately. 
However, the lack of empirical methods to indicate when mind wandering begins, makes it 
difficult to separate the initiation of mind wandering (for example when a mind wandering state 
begins) and the maintenance of mind wandering once it has been initiated (for example 
maintaining mind wandering until it is recognized and terminated) (Smallwood, 2013). As a 
result, most previous work did not distinguish between different states of mind wandering and 
the corresponding underlying processes, both at the theoretical and the experimental level, which 
could cause confusion in the interpretation of results.  
Thus, the goal of the current experiments was to develop a new approach to estimating 
time of focus (Tfocus) (ability to focus on the task at hand) and time of mind wandering (TMW) 
(the ability to maintain and/or detect mind wandering) separately in relationship to working 






In experiment 1, each participant performed mindfulness meditation sessions and their 
mind wandering was assessed using the self-caught method and subsequently the probe-caught 
method.  The duration of focus (Tfocus) and duration of mind wandering (TMW) were then 
calculated for each participant, and the relationship between their OSPAN scores and these two 
duration estimates were tested separately to examine whether working memory capacity affects 
the two aspects of mind wandering, (i.e., people’s ability to remain on task and resist the 




 Participants ranged in age from 18 years of age to 22 years of age and were recruited 
from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Only participants who have had less than a 
total of 10 hours of meditation experience were included in the data analysis, to avoid practice 
effects of meditation, as it has been shown that meditation practice can improve focused 
attention and reduce mind wandering (Braboszcz et al., 2010; Brewer et al., 2011; Hasenkamp et 
al., 2012; Lutz et al., 2008).  
Working Memory Task: 
Individual’s working memory score was measured using the Automated OSPAN task. 
This OSPAN task is a measure of working memory capacity (Unsworth et al., 2005). During this 
OSPAN task, participants first mentally solved a basic math problem (eg. (2*4)+2=?). Once 
participants finished solving the math problem, a number would be presented on the screen. The 





was true or false to the solution the participant mentally calculated. After they made their 
selection, participants would see a letter of the alphabet flash on the screen. After 3 to 7 trials, 
participants were prompted to report what letters they saw in the order they saw them. The entire 
OSPAN task took approximately 20 minutes where participants saw a total of 75 math problems 
and letters. The absolute OSPAN score is calculated as the total number of letters correctly 
recalled (For more information on the OSPAN task please see Unsworth et al., 2005).  The 
OSPAN test used for the current study was created by Millisecond Software from the following 
website (1http://www.millisecond.com/download/library/OSPAN/). 
Mindfulness Breath Meditation Task 
The main task for experiment 1 was a Mindfulness Breath Meditation task. During the 
Mindfulness Meditation task, participants were instructed to breathe normally and to focus on 
their breath (participants were instructed to focus on the sensation of their in breath and out 
breath from their nostrils). The Mindfulness Meditation task has been chosen as the task for this 
current study as it is thought to be a task with a high propensity for mind wandering and thus 
ideal to study the natural fluctuation between states of focus and states of mind wandering 
(Braboszcz, and Delorme, 2010; Hasenkamp et al., 2012; Levinson et al., 2012).   
Each participant completed the OSPAN task and four Mindfulness Mediation Sessions in the 
following order:  
1. Self-caught session 1:  The participant performed the Mindfulness Meditation Task and 
focus-mind wandering episodes were measured using the self-caught method. This 
session allowed us to calculate the average focus-mind wandering episode duration.  
2. Probe-caught session 1: The participant performed the Mindfulness Meditation Task and 





probe intervals were based on the average focus- mind wandering episode duration 
calculated from the first self-caught session (further explained below).  
3. Probe-caught session 2: If participants’ self-caught average time was less than 80 
seconds, participants performed a second probe-caught session. This session was exactly 
the same as probe-caught session 1.  If participants’ self-caught average time was longer 
than 80 seconds, participants only performed one probe-caught session, due to 
experimental time limitations (further explained below).  
4. Self-caught session 2:  The participant performed the Mindfulness Meditation Task and 
mind wandering episodes were measured using the self-caught method. This session 
allowed us to calculate the average focus-mind wandering episode duration, and was 
exactly the same as the self-caught session 1. The session was conducted to ensure that 
the timing measure between a participant’s first self-caught session and the last self-
caught session remained consistent over time (further explained below).   
Overall, the entire experiment lasted approximately 2 hours, where participants were allowed 
to take a break in between sessions.  
Self- and Probe-Caught Sessions 
In the self-caught session participants were instructed to press the space bar on the 
computer keyboard when they recognized a thought that was not focusing on their breath (any 
other thought that was not focusing on their breath, for example any thought that is not on the 
breath or breath sensation, such as future events, past events, personal events, events that are 
happening around the world, etc.). Upon pressing the spacebar to indicate a thought that was not 
focused on their breath, participants were instructed to return to their breath. Spacebar button 





Hasenkamp et al., 2012). In the probe-caught session, participants were presented with a series of 
beeps where they were asked to determine whether their focus was on their breath, or whether 
their focus was on another thought. The timing of the beeps were based on the average self-
caught time duration of the participant’s own individual focus-mind wandering episode, 
calculated from the first self-caught session. Upon hearing a probe, participants were asked to 
press the keyboard button “m” if their focus was on their breath, and press a keyboard button “z” 
if their focus was off their breath. These button presses were counterbalanced between 
participants to account for possible response biases, where half of the participants were 
instructed to press “m” if their focus was on their breath and “z” if there focus was off their 
breath, and half of the participants were instructed to press “m” if their focus was off their 
breath, and “z” if their focus was on their breath. Focus off their breath was defined as any 
thought that is not on the breath or breath sensation, such as future events, past events, personal 
events, events that are happening around the world, etc. The probe-caught session contained 4 
cycles (each cycle containing 8 probes), and was run using a program created in C++. This 
session time varied depending on the average timing from the self-caught session.   
The placement timing of the probes for the probe-caught session was based on the 
average duration of the self-caught session. After the 20 minute self-caught session, the average 
duration of a focus-mind wandering episode was calculated by finding the average duration in 
seconds between button presses during the self-caught session (measuring the start of focusing 
on breath, to when a participant realized their mind had wandered).  We then used this average to 
calculate the presentation timing of the probes for the following probe-caught sessions. To 
determine when to present the probes for each participant, we divided the mean duration from 





would be meaningful to probe and allow time for participants to enter the meditation state. For 
example, if a participant has an average of 40 seconds for the self-caught session, the 8 probe 
delays for a cycle would be 8s, 13s, 18s, 23s, 28s, 33s, 38s, and 43s. These delays were measured 
from participants’ response to the previous probe, e.g., an 8s probe would be presented 8 seconds 
after the participant responded to the previous probe.  The order of the probes were randomized 
for each cycle.  
Results and Discussion 
Overall 47 participants were excluded from data analysis. Twelve participants (11%) 
were excluded from data analysis because they had meditated for more than 10 hours, five 
participants (4.5%) were excluded from data analysis because the OSPAN score was not 
properly collected, twenty-five participants (22.5%) were excluded because of 
incomplete/inaccurate data 1 (less than 32 data points for the probe session, only one self- caught 
session, etc.), and five participants (4.5%) were excluded because there was a large discrepancy 
between their self-caught 1 and self-caught 2 data (more than one minute).2 Overall, data from 
sixty-four participants were analyzed for the current study.  
Calculating time of focus and time of mind wandering 
The duration for the time of focusing on a task (Tfocus) and the time of mind wandering 
(TMW) were calculated by combining both the self- caught sessions and the probe caught sessions 
using the following formulas: 
Tfocus=Tself*(1-p(MW)) (1) 









Tself is the average time of a focus-mind wandering episode calculated from the first and 
second self-caught sessions and ranged from 10.26 seconds and 124.90 seconds (M=43.08 
seconds, SD=27.36 seconds). p(MW) is the proportion of time a participant said that s/he was 
mind wandering based on the probe caught session alone, and ranged from .23 to .83 (M=.47, 
SD=.13). Each time was calculated separately for each participant individually. 
The logic for Equations 1 and 2 is straightforward.  As illustrated above in Figure 1a, Tself 
is a measure of the average duration of an individual’s focus-mind wandering episodes in 
seconds (when they start focusing on the task to when they catch themselves mind wandering), 
which is the sum of the time of focus and the time of mind wandering.  That is, 
Tself = Tfocus + TMW         (3) 
Moreover, when sampled randomly or uniformly, the chance a probe falls in the period of 
focus state (p(focus)) relative to the chance of the probe falling in the period of mind wandering 
(p(MW) = 1 - p(focus) ) is determined by the relative duration of time of focus and time of mind 
wandering in a  focus-mind wandering episode.  That is, 
p(focus) : p(MW) = Tfocus : TMW       (4) 
Solving equations 3 and 4, we will get equations 1 and 2. 
To test whether a participant’s first self-caught session and the last self-caught session 
were generally consistent over time, the first self-caught session and the last self-caught session 
for each participant were compared. Of the 98 participants who had data from the first self-
caught session (ranging from 6.53 seconds to 353.94 seconds (M=50.12 seconds, SD=45.50 
seconds)) and the second self-caught session (ranging from 6.91 seconds to 304.46 seconds 





average duration of the self-caught session one and the self-caught session two, r(96)=.78, 
p<.001. 
Because there was a relatively large number of participants excluded from analysis, 
mostly due to incomplete data, the average OSPAN score of included participants was compared 
with the average OSPAN score of excluded participants to determine whether we have 
differentially excluded certain participants. A two-sample t-test showed that there was not a 
significant difference in OSPAN scores for included participants (M=49.66, SD=14.20) and 
OSPAN scores for excluded participants (M=49.87, SD=14.99), t(100)= -0.071, p=.94,  d=0.014, 
95% CI [-6.10 , 5.68].  
Linear Regression Analysis 
As illustrated in Figure 2a, there was not a significant relationship between the average 
duration of self-caught focus-mind wandering episodes calculated from reports using only the 
self-caught sessions (Tself) and OSPAN score, r=.16, t(62)=1.27, p=0.21  with an R2  of 0.03, F(1, 
62)=1.6. As illustrated in Figure 2b, there was a marginally significant relationship between 
proportion of mind wandering probes and OSPAN score, r=.24, t(62)=1.96, p=.054 with an R2  
of 0.06, F(1, 62)=3.86.    
Of most importance to the current study, to analyze the relationship between working 
memory capacity and different states within a focus-mind wandering episode, two linear 
regressions were performed separately (time of focus (Tfocus) as a function of OSPAN score, and 
time of mind wandering (TMW) as a function of OSPAN score). As illustrated in Figure 3a 
((Tfocus) as a function of OSPAN score), there was a significant positive relationship between 





p=.032 with an R2  of 0.07 F(1, 62)=4.81. As OSPAN scores increased, so did the time within the 
focus state.  
As illustrated in Figure 3b (time in a mind wandering state (TMW ) as a function of 
OSPAN score), there was not a significant relationship between time of mind wandering and 
OSPAN score, r=.006, t(62)=0.047, p=0.96 with an R2  of 0.00, F(1, 62)=0.002. 
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Figure 2. Results of Experiment 1.  a) the scatter plot along with the Linear Regression line of duration of a full 
focus-mind wandering episode (including both the focus duration and mind wandering duration), calculated from the 
self-caught sessions alone (Tself), as a function of OSPAN score.  b) scatter plot along with the Linear Regression 
line of the proportion of time in the mind wandering state (mind wandering proportion or p(MW)) overall, 
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Figure 3. Results of Experiment 1. a) the scatter plot along with the Linear Regression line, of the mean time in the 
focus state (Tfocus) during a focus-mind wandering episode, calculated from both the self-caught and probe-caught 
sessions, as a function of OSPAN score.  b) the scatter plot along with the Linear Regression line, of the mean time 
in the mind wandering state (TMW) during a focus- mind wandering episode, calculated from both the self-caught 
and probe-caught sessions, as a function of OSPAN score. 
 
Overall, the results of mean time of focus (Tfocus) and mean time of mind wandering 
(TMW) were of most importance here. Results showed that Tfocus increased with greater working 
memory capacity, suggesting that individuals with higher working memory capacity were able to 
focus on the current task longer. Results did not show a significant relationship between TMW and 
working memory capacity, suggesting that the ability to sustain the mind wandering state and/or 







Although experiment 1 showed clear results, as illustrated in the introduction, mind 
wandering can be affected by various factors, such as the demand of the current task. Because 
the main task for experiment 1 was a mindfulness meditation task, which is a low demanding 
task, the relationships found here may only apply to low demanding tasks such as mindfulness 
meditation, and may not generalize to other tasks, specifically tasks requiring higher task 
demands.  Experiment 2 sought to explore the relationship between our calculated measures of 
Tfocus and TMW and task difficulty, specifically reading difficulty.   
Using the same approach to calculate Tfocus and TMw as experiment 1, experiment 2 
examined the effects of reading difficulty on the two states of mind wandering by asking 
participants to read easy and difficult passages and report mind wandering using both the self-
caught and probe-caught methods. Like experiment 1, the mean duration of the two states of a 
focus-mind wandering episode was calculated for each participant individually, and these 
durations in the easy and difficult reading conditions were then compared to examine the effects 
of reading difficulty on different aspects of mind wandering. 
Methods 
Participants:  
24 participants recruited from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
participated in the current study, and received course credit for participating. A total of four 
participants were excluded from data analyses. Two participants were excluded because they did 
not report any self-caught mind wandering instances and thus our calculations of Tfocus and TMW 
could not be calculated, and two participants did not complete all of the required readings in the 







The reading material were taken from http://etc.usf.edsu/lit2go/ website, which is a 
website with a collection of books, stories, etc., and their corresponding Flesch-Kincaid Grade 
Level Readability score. Difficulty and ease of the reading material used for the specific 
conditions were based on the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Readability Score (Flesch-Kincaid 
Grade Level = (.39 × ASL) + (11.8 × ASW) - 15.59), where ASL is the average sentence length, 
and ASW is the average number of syllables per word) (Kincaid et al., 1975).  
Reading Task: 
The reading task consisted of 6 different readings taken from https://etc.usf.edu/lit2go/. 
Three of the passages were categorized as easy to read with a Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level 
Readability score of 6. The other three passages were categorized as difficult to read with a 
Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Readability score of 12 (Feng et al. 2013). Participants were 
presented with a reading passage and were asked to read the passage like they would read a 
passage normally at their own pace. Passages 1, 2, and 3 were categorized as the Easy Readings 
and came from “Philosophy and Fun of Algebra” (1909) by Boole (approximately 2779 words 
long and took an average of 11.7 min (SD=3.9 min) to read). Passages 4, 5 and 6 where 
categorized as the Difficult Readings and came from “History of Modern Mathematics” (1906) 
by Smith, D.E. (1906) (approximately 2424 words and took an average of 11.3 min (SD=4.3 
min) to read). 
Experimental Order:   
Each participant completed two blocks of reading tasks, one for easy reading and one for 
difficult reading. Each block contained three sessions of reading.  In each session, the participant 





measured using either the self-caught method (used to calculate the average focus-mind 
wandering episode duration), or the probe-caught method, just like experiment 1. In each block, 
the participant first completed a self-caught session, followed by two probe-caught sessions, just 
like experiment 1. The reading level blocks were counterbalanced across participants. The 
average Tself measure obtained from the self-caught session was used to uniformly distribute the 
probes for each participant in the probe-caught sessions, as discussed below.  
After each reading, a reading comprehension quiz as well as questions pertaining to the 
motivation and interest level of the reading was administered. The results of the reading 
comprehension quizzes will not be discussed here. Like experiment 1, the entire experiment 
lasted approximately two hours, where participants were allowed to take a break in between 
sessions.   
Self-Caught and Probe-Caught sessions:  
 During the self-caught sessions, participants read either an easy or a difficult reading 
passage. They were asked to read the reading passage like they normally would and to press the 
spacebar on a keyboard when they realized their current stream of thought was not focused on 
the reading (for example any thought about future events, past events, personal events, events 
that are happening around the world, etc.). Similar to experiment 1, participants were instructed 
to return to the reading once they pressed the spacebar indicating that they have noticed their 
mind was off of the reading. Button presses were recorded for all participants. 
During the probe-caught session, participants read the reading passage presented and 
heard a series of beeps throughout the session (Bastian and Sackur, 2013; Christoff et al., 2009; 
Seli et al., 2013). The timing of the beeps were based on the average self-caught time duration of 





corresponding reading level. Similar to experiment 1, upon hearing a probe, participants were 
asked to press the keyboard button “m” if their focus was on the reading and press a keyboard 
button “z” if their focus was off the reading (these button presses were counterbalanced between 
subjects). Focus off the reading was defined as any thought that is not on the reading, such as 
future events, past events, personal events, events that are happening around the world, etc. The 
total number of probes varied for each subject as the session was based on the participants’ self-
paced reading time.  
Using the self-caught session to inform the probe-caught session: 
The placement of the probes for the probe-caught sessions was almost identical to 
experiment 1 except for the placement of the first probe. Since self-caught mind wandering 
instances tend to be less frequent in tasks that are more demanding, we wanted to maximize the 
time of probe presentations. To maximize the time of probe presentations, the shortest probe was 
half of the unit distribution time, and the remainder of the probes increased based on the time 
unit of the average self-duration for each individual divided by 8. For example, if a participant 
has an average of 60 seconds for the self-caught session, the particular participant will have a 
unit time of 7.5 seconds. The shortest probe was (60/8)/2 which was 3.75 seconds. All of the 
other probes were at a uniform distribution separated by the unit time. For a participant with an 
average of 60 seconds for the self-caught session, their probe distribution was 3.75 seconds, 
11.25 seconds, 18.75 seconds, 26.25 seconds, 33.75 seconds, 41.25 seconds, 48.75 seconds, and 
56.25 seconds.  
After a participant started the reading, one cycle of all 8 probes was presented in a 
random order, then another cycle of the 8 probes in a random order was presented, until the 





Results and Discussion 
As illustrated in figure 4a, using the self-caught method alone, there was a significant 
difference between the mean self-caught duration in the easy (M=91.50 sec, SD=88.20 sec) and 
the hard (M=61.85 sec, SD=55.12) reading condition, t(19) = 3.07 , p = .006, 95% CI [9.46, 
49.84]. Additionally, as illustrated in figure 4b, using the probe-caught method alone, there was a 
significant difference between the mean probe-caught proportion in the easy (M=0.66 sec, 
SD=.19 sec)  and the hard (M=.49 sec, SD=.23 sec)  reading condition, t(19) = 3.61 , p = .002, 
95% CI [0.07, 0.27].  
Figure 4 
 
Figure 4. a) Average Self-Caught duration in the easy and hard reading condition b) Average Probe-Caught duration 
in the easy and hard reading condition 
Of most importance, were the calculations of Time of Focus (TFocus) and Time of Mind 
Wandering (TMW). Tfocus and TMW were calculated the same as experiment 1 (according to Eqs. 1 
and 2 as explained in experiment 1). As illustrated in figure 5c, there was a significant difference 
between the mean Tfocus measurement in the easy (M=60.82 sec, SD=67.78 sec) and the hard 





but as illustrated in figure 5d, there was not a significant difference between the mean TMW 
measurement in the easy (M=30.68 sec, SD=31.26 sec) and the hard (M=27.53 sec, SD=27.98 
sec) reading condition, t(19) = 0.86 , p = .40, 95% CI [-4.52, 10.82].  
Figure 5 
 
Figure 5: c) Average Tfocus duration in the easy and hard reading condition  d) Average TMW duration in the easy 
and hard reading condition 
Of most importance here there was a significant difference in Tfocus between the easy 
reading and the hard reading conditions, but there was not a significant difference in TMW 
between the easy reading and hard reading conditions. The results that there was a longer time of 
focus in the easy readings compared to hard readings, indicate that individuals were able to focus 
on the reading longer in easy readings. This could be because individuals were better able to 
engage in the easy readings than the hard readings, and thus more easily form a situational model 
of the easy reading leading to a longer time of focus (Feng et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2008). 
On the other hand, the result that there was no difference in time of mind wandering between the 
easy reading condition and the hard reading condition indicates that once mind wandering 






The aim of the current experiments was to develop a more informative method to 
measure mind wandering, by calculating the mean time focused on the current task at hand 
(measuring the ability to stay on task and resist mind wandering (Tfocus)) and mean time in a 
mind wandering state (measuring processes for the continuation of mind wandering and/or the 
ability to catch mind wandering (TMW)), a key distinction proposed in the Process-Occurrence 
framework (Smallwood, 2013). Here the traditional self-caught method and the traditional probe-
caught methods are combined to illuminate the different states within a focus-mind wandering 
episode. In this method, the self-caught method provides a measure of the estimated length of the 
entire focus-mind wandering episode, while the probe-caught method provides a measure of the 
relative proportion of each of the components. From these measures, the duration of each 
component (Tfocus) and (TMW) can thus be calculated, providing an empirical method to examine 
the time course of the sub-components of the focus-mind wandering episode separately. 
Results from experiment 1 showed most importantly a significant positive relationship 
between working memory capacity and time of focus (Tfocus), indicating that individuals with 
higher working memory capacities were better able to block out mind wandering and focus on 
the current task at hand longer. Working memory capacity however did not have a significant 
effect on the time of mind wandering (TMW) in a focus-mind wandering episode in experiment 1, 
suggesting that once mind wandering occurs, it will last a comparable amount of time regardless 
of working memory capacity. Similarly, of most importance experiment 2 showed a significant 
difference in Tfocus between the easy reading and the hard reading conditions, but not a 





that individuals were able to focus on the reading longer in easy readings, but once mind 
wandering occurs, it will last a comparable amount of time regardless of reading difficulty.  
Taken together, these results show the importance of differentiating the different states of 
mind wandering when looking at experimental results in order to get a meaningful interpretation 
of mind wandering tendency as suggested by Smallwood (2013). As outlined in the introduction, 
the Resource Hypothesis and the Executive Control Hypothesis predict different patterns of 
behavior in relationship to mind wandering tendency, but these theories do not take into account 
different subcomponents of mind wandering. As discussed in the introduction, according to the 
Process-Occurrence Framework (Smallwood, 2013), different underlying processes could be 
involved with the initiation of mind wandering and the maintenance of mind wandering once it 
occurs. In regards to the initiation of mind wandering, the process-occurrence framework states 
that executive control could influence mind wandering directly by increasing focus on the task 
and thus inhibiting the initiation of mind wandering from occurring. Here Smallwood (2013) 
argued that attentional control would help participants stay on task by limiting the occurrence of 
mind wandering by ensuring focus on the current task at hand. The finding from experiment 1 
that time of focus (Tfocus) positively correlates with working memory capacity, is consistent with 
this prediction.  
In regards to reading difficulty and mind wandering, reading difficulty can affect one’s 
ability to engage and focus on a present reading text and thus form a situational model (Feng et 
al., 2013, Smallwood, 2011; Smallwood et al., 2008; Unsworth and McMillian, 2012). For 
example, the more discontinuities in cohesion a reading passage has (more difficult readings) the 
harder it can be to construct a situational model of the text, and thus lead to difficulties in 





able to focus for a longer time on easy readings than on difficult readings (Feng et al., 2013, 
Smallwood, 2011; Smallwood et al., 2008). In line with this, the results of experiment 2 showed 
that individuals were able to focus longer in the easy readings than the hard readings. In regards 
to Smallwood’s (2013) process-occurrence framework is separating the occurrence and 
maintenance of mind wandering, this could mean that the ease of forming a situational model 
based on reading difficulty, can influence participants ability to stay focused on the reading task 
and limit the occurrence of mind wandering.  
Although working memory capacity and reading difficulty affects one’s ability to 
maintain task focus, it does not show a reciprocal relationship to the length of the mind-
wandering state. The independence of TMW from working memory capacity and reading 
difficulty can have at least two possibilities. One possibility is that if terminating mind 
wandering is due to a failure to sustain the internal thought processes, then these results suggest 
that processes that sustain focus on the current task are different from those that maintain the 
internal train of thought. Another possibility is that the termination of a mind wandering state is 
primarily due to a separate, self-monitoring system that determines one’s meta-awareness of the 
mind wandering event. Thus, a mind wandering event may be terminated even if there’s 
sufficient resource to maintain its continuation. Under this scenario, the results here would 
suggest that the self-monitoring/meta-awareness system is not dependent on working memory 
capacity (experiment 1) or reading difficulty (experiment 2). Either way, the results from both 
experiment 1 and experiment 2 provide empirical evidence that theories of mind-wandering need 
to account for multiple component processes, as emphasized in the Process-Occurrence 
framework (Smallwood, 2013). As such, characteristics of mind wandering may be better 





In addition, as discussed in the introduction, the use of the term tendency to mind wander 
is ambiguous, and can have multiple meanings. For example, the tendency to mind wander can 
mean the likelihood mind wandering will occur while focusing on a task. Here the mean duration 
one can stay on the current task before switching to mind wandering (i.e., Tfocus) can measure this 
likelihood. As such, a shorter Tfocus indicates a higher tendency/likelihood to mind wander. The 
tendency to mind wander might also mean the duration of time one spends in a mind wandering 
state once it is initiated. The mean duration of mind wandering in each episode (i.e., TMW) 
measures this tendency. As such, the longer the TMW, the higher one’s tendency to mind wander. 
Finally, the tendency to mind wander can also mean the total amount of time one spends mind 
wandering. Here, the probe-caught measure of the proportion of mind wandering can index this 
tendency, but the theoretical meaning of this type of tendency is difficult to interpret (Bastian 
and Sackur, 2013; Christoff et al., 2012; Seli et al., 2013; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). This 
is because the proportion of time one spends on mind wandering is determined by two 
independent components, Tfocus and TMW (as discussed in the introduction), and does not have a 
clear correspondence to the underlying mechanism or processes. As such, until a more concrete 
definition of tendency or likelihood to mind wander is developed, drawing conclusions based on 
experimental findings as well as specific theories speaking to the tendency/likelihood of mind 
wandering can be difficult to interpret. As such, a more interpretable way to measure mind 
wandering may be to describe the durations of its sub-components separately, such as Tfocus and 
TMW.   
Limitations and future directions 
Despite the improvements in the methodology, there are still some limitations in the 





individuals in a uniform manner based on a fixed number derived from the average of the first 
self-caught session. However, the actual duration of the focus-mind wandering episode varied 
from one episode to the next, therefore the uniform probe distribution is only an approximation. 
As such, it may not fully reflect the true proportion of Tfocus and TMW in the focus-mind 
wandering episode. Ideally, the probe distribution should match the individual episode durations, 
but due to the unpredictability of the individual episode durations, it’s not possible to match them 
in practice. Therefore the mean self-caught duration was used for the maximum match to 
different episode durations. If we include probes longer than the mean episode duration, we can 
accommodate events that are longer than the average, however as a result it will not properly 
represent those events equal to or shorter than the average duration, and can potentially cause 
more bias overall. Therefore as a compromise we tailored the probe sampling distribution to the 
mean episode duration to maximize the number of events we can match properly. Whether there 
are alternative ways to determine the probe distribution to further improve the sampling accuracy 
remains a challenge for future research. For example one could possibly varying the sampling 
window location (e.g., instead of sampling from a fixed range within [3s, Tself+3s], one may 
sample from [x, Tself+x] with varying x), or varying the sampling window size according to the 
variance of Tself. Whether these alternative methods improve the overall accuracy of the 
estimation awaits further study. 
Another consequence of the above method is that by uniformly distributing the probes 
within a focus-mind wandering cycle, some of the probe delays were quite short. The frequent 
probe presentation could potentially interfere with typical task focus, especially for individuals 
who have a short focus-mind wandering episode. One way to ameliorate this limitation in future 





average focus-mind wandering episode to increase the delay between each probing, especially 
for people with short Tself.  In addition, the probe presentation was based on the average duration 
of the self-caught mind wandering measure for each individual. This means that each individual 
was probed at different times depending on their self-caught mind wandering measure. A line of 
future research should be whether these different sampling times can affect individuals’ 
behavior. 
Finally, in regards to task difficulty, although the effect in experiment 2 was strong, the 
reading task can have potential confounding factors when determining how mind wandering acts 
with different task difficulties. For example, although we tried to keep the topic of the easy 
reading and the hard reading the same (about math) to alleviate topic biases, the easy reading 
might have been more engaging and thus the effect might reflect task interest or engagement. To 
further investigate mind wandering and task difficulty, a different task isolating task difficulty, 
can be used to further investigate the effect of task difficulty and mind wandering.  
In summary, the current experiments developed a new methodology to estimate the 
timing of different states within a focus-mind wandering episode and measured how they are 
affected by working memory capacity. The results of experiment 1 showed that people with 
higher working memory capacity tend to remain on the current task longer.  However, once mind 
wandering occurs, it will last for a comparable duration regardless of the working memory 
capacity. Similarly, experiment 2 showed that there was a longer time of focus in the easy 
readings compared to hard readings, but showed no difference in time of mind wandering 
between the easy reading condition and the hard reading condition, indicating that once mind 
wandering occurs, it will last a comparable amount of time regardless of reading difficulty as 





mind wandering when looking at experimental results in order to get a meaningful interpretation 
of mind wandering tendency, and emphasizes the need to differentiate the different states and 
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